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Abstract
This study examines how negative skewness a⁄ects the behaviour
of prudent investors. It also shows how the commonly used frame-
work in the intertemporal asset pricing and the dynamic portfolio-
consumption choice literature can generate negative skewness in asset
reutrns. Given this impact, an extra premium is required in order to
hold an asset with negatively coskewed returns. This premium was, on
average, 2.09% p.a. for the UK stock market universe. Hence, a new
performance measure, the intercept of the Harvey-Siddique two-factor
asset pricing model is suggested for prudent, long-term investors. Us-
ing this model, the performance of UK unit trusts is examined over
the period 1991-2005. Despite exhibiting signi￿cantly negative mana-
gerial ability, trust managers were successful in reaping part of this
negative coskewness premium.
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11 Introduction
Most of theory of ￿nance has been developed within a static, mean-variance
framework. The main examples of this framework is the mean-variance
portfolio choice by Markowitz (1952) and the Sharpe (1964)-Lintner (1965)-
Mossin (1996) Capital Asset Pricing Model. These pathbreaking contribu-
tions served as an excellent ￿rst exploration of the complex world of asset
prices and had an immense impact on the investment industry. Nevertheless,
the limitations of this framework are numerous and crucial.
Extensive research in the time series behaviour of the stock returns showed
that these exhibit a series of stylized facts, such as time-varying volatility,
predictability, negative skewness and excess kurtosis. Hence, returns clearly
violate the assumption of being normally or identically distributed over time.
Equally importantly, there has been documented signi￿cant empirical failure
of the CAPM. In a series of papers, Fama and French (1993, 1995) established
that value and size strategies generate returns that cannot be explained by
beta-risk loading. The momentum strategy documented by Jegadeesh and
Titman (1993) is another "anomaly".
Severe criticism to the CAPM assumptions comes from utility theory too.
The assumption of quadratic preferences is clearly rejected since it implies
increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA). A desirable property of a utility
function is that agents are averse to negative skewness and have a preference
for payo⁄s exhibiting positive skewness. This behaviour is termed prudence
(see Kimball, 1990). Interestingly, experimental evidence (see Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979) showed that there is an asymmetrically higher impact on
utility by losses as related to gains, leading to a class of utility functions such
as the Disappointment Aversion by Gul (1991). These functions imply that
agents are even more averse to negative skewness. Hence, aversion to negative
skewness is a crucial feature that has been neglected in asset pricing. In this
spirit, the present study employs the stochastic discount factor framework
to show how that negative coskewness bears a risk premium. Harvey and
2Siddique (2000) provide evidence for the existence of this premium.
Another very important limitation of the CAPM is its static nature. The
recent asset pricing literature has attempted to resolve the documented "an-
omalies" within an intertemporal framework. The studies of Vassalou (2003),
Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) and Petkova (2006), inter alia, provide
characteristic examples. This approach has its origins in the Intertemporal
CAPM of Merton (1973). The most important observation is that there is
a set of underlying risk factors which evolve stochastically through time and
a⁄ect the dynamics of asset returns. The present study takes a further step
showing that the impact of these risk factors on asset returns can be repres-
ented by means of higher moments. In other words, the intertemporal risks
can be interpreted as higher moments risks. Having drawn this link, it is dis-
cussed how the outperformance of the size, value and momentum strategies
can be explained as risk premia due to negative coskewness.
Asset pricing models play a signi￿cant role in investment performance
evaluation, hence the assumptions of these models are crucial in order to un-
derstand the incentives generated. Fund managers try to distinguish them-
selves from their peers on the basis of these measures. Therefore, they re-
spond to these incentives by adopting investment strategies, which generate
excess returns and help them outperform. If the employed measure, however,
does not take into account all underlying risk factors, then the managers will
be incentivised to load the neglected risks to their portfolios in order to reap
the relevant premia and outperform.
This issue becomes of utmost importance when we deal with delegated as-
set management, where a series of issues related to principal-agent problems
arise due to asymmetric information (see Spencer, 2000, for an analytical
treatment). Closely related to the choice of a performance measure is the
issue of ex post veri￿cation: This refers to the problem of a principal (fund
shareholder) to fairly evaluate the investment outcome of the agent (fund
manager). To this end, there have been suggested a series of performance
3measures, according to which, managers should be classi￿ed and rewarded.
The most obvious reason is the necessity of having an objective way to com-
pensate and promote managers (resolving the ex post veri￿cation problem).
The present study reviews the most commonly used performance meas-
ures and discusses the assumptions on which they are based. The incentives
for speci￿c investment strategies generated by the corresponding measures
are discussed. In particular, mean-variance measures create the incentive to
invest in assets exhibiting negative coskewness. Consequently, the Harvey-
Siddique two-factor asset pricing model, which adds a negative coskewness
mimicking portfolio factor, is proposed to be an appropriate framework for a
long-term, prudent investor. This model takes into account the risk premia
formed in capital markets due to the participants￿aversion to negative skew-
ness as well as the risk premia arising due to the desire of long-term investors
to hedge against negative shocks in the underlying opportunity set. The in-
tercept of this model, which we term as Harvey-Siddique alpha, is employed
as a performance measure to evaluate the performance of UK unit trusts
during the period 1991-2005.
In order to perform this analysis, the returns of a zero-cost coskewness
spread portfolio have been calculated for the UK, showing that the average
monthly return of this strategy was 2:09% p.a. over the period 1991-2005.
Previewing our results, the unit trusts investing in the FTSE All Share had
an average Harvey-Siddique alpha of ￿2:12% p.a., while their average Jensen
alpha was ￿1:23% p.a. The regression analysis discovered that almost all of
the examined trusts had a positive loading on the coskewness strategy, for
the most of them being statistically signi￿cant too. Most interestingly, the
trusts which had the highest Jensen alphas were those with very high load-
ings on negative coskewness. The nonnormality of the trusts￿performance
distribution can be indeed attributed to heterogeneous risk-taking, with the
coskewness strategy being a main source of this heterogeneity. The subperiod
analysis yielded similar results.
4There are two main conclusions from this study: Firstly, long-term,
prudent investors who are averse to negative skewness, should employ the
Harvey-Siddique alpha in order to neutralize the incentives of trust man-
agers to load this type of risk. For this type of investors, most of UK
unit trusts managers exhibited a signi￿cantly negative managerial ability.
Secondly, the trust managers were very succesful to reap the negative co-
skewness premium priced in the market, boosting their returns and correctly
responding to their incentives, since they were evaluated according to static,
mean-variance measures, which regard this premium as a "free lunch".
2 Motivation
2.1 (Co)skewness in asset pricing
The central problem in Asset Pricing is to ￿nd a valid Stochastic Discount
Factor (SDF) M for future payo⁄s. Formally, the SDF is assumed to be
positive (see Harrison and Kreps, 1979), it is unique under complete markets
and satis￿es the following relationship:
Pt = Et[Mt+sXt+s] (1)
where Pt is the price of an asset at time t and Xt+s denotes the asset
payo⁄(s) at time t + s.
In a one-period ahead framework, gross returns Rt+1 =
Xt+1
Pt = 1 + rt+1
are employed to re-write:
1 = Et[Mt+1Rt+1] (2)
It is straightforward to derive the following relationships (see Smith and
Wickens, 2002 for an analytical treatment), which relate the SDF, the risky
and the risk-free asset return r
f
t :
51 = Et(Mt+1)(1 + r
f















t = ￿(1 + r
f
t )Cov(Mt+1;rt+1) (5)
This equation implies that the excess expected return of a risky asset
depends on the covariance of the SDF with this return.
A commonly used ad hoc assumption is that the SDF is linear in the
market returns:
Mt+1 = a + brM;t+1 (6)
where rM;t+1 is the return of the market portfolio, usually proxied by a
stock market index.
Such a speci￿cation leads to the standard CAPM. In particular,
Et(rt+1) ￿ r
f
t = ￿(1 + r
f
t )bCov(rM;t+1;rt+1) (7)
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V ar(rM;t+1) is essentially the coe¢ cient of regressing (rt+1￿r
f
t )
on (rm;t+1 ￿ r
f
t ).
But is this a legitimate speci￿cation for the SDF? Harvey and Siddique





0(Wt) as an SDF to show the
implications of this linear speci￿cation. Taking a ￿rst-order Taylor series
expansion of U

















rm;t+1 = 1 ￿ ￿rm;t+1 (10)
where we have used the simple relationship Wt+1 = Wt(1 + rm;t+1) and






0(Wt) . This implies that the ad hoc SDF (6) can be regarded as an
approximation to the marginal rate of substitution, with a = 1 and b = ￿￿.
However, there is no particular reason why the truncation of the Taylor






















































00(Wt) is the measure of Relative Prudence de￿ned by Kimball








m;t+1, the SDF in (11)
can now be written as:
7m = 1 + brm;t+1 + cr
2
m;t+1 (12)
This is not a linear SDF any more, since the squared market returns
are involved. Recalling the fundamental asset pricing equation (5) of the
SDF approach, the expected excess return of an asset now depends on the
covariance of this asset returns not only with the market portfolio return but
also with the squared market returns. This is exactly what the coskewness
measures. In the standard case of ￿ > 0 ) c > 0, the fundamental equation










Therefore, for given Cov(rM;t+1;rt+1), we have two cases with respect to
the Cov(r2
M;t+1;rt+1):
On the one hand, if Cov(r2
M;t+1;rt+1) > 0, then Et(rt+1)￿r
f
t is now lower
in comparison to the case of equation (7). This implies that if a risky asset
has positive coskewness with the market returns, then it will bear a lower risk
premium. On the other hand, if Cov(r2
M;t+1;rt+1) < 0, then Et(rt+1) ￿ r
f
t is
now higher. In other words, a prudent investor seeks an extra risk premium
in order to hold an asset the returns of which are characterized by negat-
ive coskewness. Therefore, if ￿nancial markets are dominated by prudent
investors, expected returns should be higher for assets having negative co-
skewness with the market portfolio. This is a key result in our analysis.
A similar exposition would be also informative in an equilibrium model.












0(Ct) Rt+1 = Mt+1 a valid SDF. The standard approach is to take
a ￿rst-order Taylor series expansion of U







’ ￿(1 ￿ ￿￿ln(Ct+1)) (15)
As it has been mentioned, there is no theoretical reason why the Taylor-
series expansion should be truncated in the ￿rst order. If we take a second-
order expansion of U







































Even though the tidy linear form is abandoned, the advantage of expres-
sion (16) is that another important term appears now, which involves the
quadratic change in the consumption level. This essentially implies that the
volatility of the consumption change is an important factor in asset pricing.
Neglecting this volatility we may ignore important information. A similar
argument can be found in Brav et al. (2002) in a model with multiple agents
and incomplete consumption insurance. They argue that the cross-sectional
properties of the variance and skewness of consumption growth rates are
important in asset pricing even though they do not explicitly incorporate
prudence in their analysis.
2.2 (Co)skewness in preferences
Examining the impact of coskewness on asset pricing, the assumption of





0(Wt) was made. It is important to explain how this
assumption is derived. In particular, the current analysis deals with utility
functions which share the following properties:
i) Monotonicity U
0(Wt) > 0
9ii) Concavity, i.e. the idnividuals are risk averse and U
00(Wt) < 0.
Furthermore, a desirable property of a utility function is to exhibit De-
creasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA). This property implies that the
wealthier an investor is, the less risk averse he must be over a speci￿c amount








for this to be decreasing in wealth it should hold:
#(ARA)
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due to the properties previously stated. The positivity of the third derivative
of the utility function can be also interpreted as prudence. Leland (1968) and
Sandmo (1970) argue that this behaviour is associated with the motive for
precautionary savings in the face of future income/consumption uncertainty.
In general, prudence could be characterized as the sensitivity of the optimal
choice for a decision variable with respect to its variability (see Kimball, 1990
for an analytical treatment). It is important to note that this behaviour is
distinct from risk aversion. In particular, under quadratic utility, U(W) =
aW + bW 2, the individual, has zero measure of prudence, even though he is
risk averse when b < 0.
Extending the previous analysis, it is very informative to examine the
interplay between returns￿distributions and preferences. It is expected that
a risk-averse and prudent investor has a preference over positively skewed
payo⁄s and an aversion towards negatively skewed ones. In other words, a
negatively skewed distribution implies higher downside risk provoking aver-
sion to investors. There is signi￿cant actual evidence in the markets sup-
porting this argument. The very popular portfolio insurance products are
10protecting investors against downside risk. Moreover, most of modern risk
management is based on the avoidance of extreme negative retuns. The most
characteristic example is the Value-at-Risk (VaR) measurement.
Further evidence is provided by the option-implied distribution, which is
constructed by option prices across di⁄erent strike prices on an underlying
asset over a speci￿c period and it is a very powerful tool to illustrate this
behaviour. Option-implied distributions, after the 1987 crash, are typically
negatively-skewed. In particular, deep out-of-the-money puts, which are pop-
ular instruments for portfolio insurance, have quite high prices relatively to
the ones implied by the Black and Scholes (1973) model. This creates the
smirk in the implied volatility-strike price graph, in contrast to the constant
volatility assumption of Black-Scholes. This feature of option prices has been
termed crashophobia (see Jackwerth, 2004, for analytical discussion). On the
other hand, preference for positive skewness is evident in lotteries. Agents
are willing to participate in lotteries with positive skewness (see for example,
Golec and Tamarkin, 1998), even though these have negative expected val-
ues (unfair games). It is worth mentioning that participation in such unfair
games increases as positive skewness increases (e.g. jackpots in lotteries).
In order to examine more formally the impact of skewness on expected
utility, it proves useful to perform a Taylor series expansion around the mean
level of wealth W. Then, the expected utility at time t over wealth at time




U(k)(W t+1)(Wt+1 ￿ W t+1)k
k!
] (19)






Et[(Wt+1 ￿ W t+1)
k] (20)
In a portfolio choice context, the case of k = 2 corresponds to the familiar
mean-variance analysis, ￿ la Markowitz. If we truncate the Taylor series
expansion at order k = 3, the third moment of the wealth distribution is
taken into account, i.e.:










The expansion of the expected utility shows the importance of asymmet-
ries in the risky asset distributions. If we have a symmetric distribution, then
the last term vanishes and is irrelevant for the portfolio choice, even if the
agent is prudent. Since most of asset returns are characterized by negative
skewness, it becomes evident that the mean-variance Weltanschauung is only
a restrictive case of the general problem.
Interestingly, the impact of skewness is often examined under the assump-
tion of a CRRA utility, such as the power utility function, U(W) = W1￿￿
1￿￿ .
The main characteristic of this function is that it treats symmetrically utility
gains and losses due to a wealth change of the same magnitude. Actually, this
is also a property of the mean-variance analysis. It assumes that individuals
do not distinguish between volatility and downside risk.
Nevertheless, there is signi￿cant experimental evidence that agents are
mainly averse to losses, not just to volatility. The Loss Aversion Theory of
1Lhabitant (1998) argues that if the Taylor series is uniformly convergent, then we also





k! ) can be integrated out
of the expectation term-by-term. Lhabitant￿ s assumtpions depend on the choice of the
utility function. In the case of power utility function, convergence occurs for wealth levels
in the range of [0;2W], which is not such a restrictive range.
12Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) as well the Disappointment Aversion frame-
work of Gul (1991) imply that investors maintain an asymmetric attitude to-
wards losses as compared to gains. In other words, investors are more averse
to negative skewness in comparison to CRRA agents. The non-paticipation
in capital markets is a consequence of these preferences. In particular, mean-
variance theory predicts that even agents who are extremely risk averse,
should hold a portion of their portfolio in the risky asset which bears a posit-
ive risk premium. Nevertheless, actual data show that a large proportion of
households have zero holdings in risky assets (see e.g. Haliassos and Bertaut,
1995).
Ang et al. (2005) provide a very detailed treatment of the portfolio choice
problem under Disappointment Aversion. In particular, the preferences of











where A ￿ 1, K = Pr(W ￿ s) + APr(W > s) and s is the certainty
equivalent of wealth. If A = 1 then K = 1 and we get back the standard
utility speci￿cation. For A < 1 the investors are averse to losses or disap-
pointment averse. Such a speci￿cation essentially implies a transformation
of the probabilities assigned to various realizations of the wealth distribu-
tion. In particular, realizations of wealth levels below s are assigned a higher
weight than the corresponding realizations above s. In other words, agents
are more averse to negative skewness in comparison to power utility agents.
Interestingly, from equation (21) one can observe that even if the distribution
is symmetric, the higher moments would still be important for the portfolio
choice problem due to the asymmetric impact of returns on preferences.
There is a number of regulatory, legal and psychological issues related
with the aversion towards negative skewness. Moreover, pension funds and
insurance companies usually face legal obligations to pay out ￿xed or quasi-
13￿xed amounts. The same holds for households with legal obligations over
mortgages, loan installments or fees. Habit formation is another example of
anchoring one￿ s preferences around a reference point and being reluctant to
accept any wealth level below that. This mixture of obligations and pref-
erences make pension funds, insurance companies and individuals willing to
hedge against large negative movements in asset prices.
2.3 (Co)skewness, market "anomalies" and intertem-
poral risks
The previous section exhibited that negative (co)skewness plays a signi￿cant
role in asset pricing and portfolio choice. Consequently, ignoring the risk
premia assigned to negative coskewness can lead to ine¢ cient investment
policies as well as inappropriate performance evaluation. It is argued in
this subsection that the documented asset pricing "anomalies" which are
currently being explained as premia for intertemporal risks are directly linked
to negative coskewness.
Among the most often cited failures of the CAPM is the outperform-
ance of size and value strategies. Fama and French (1993, p.55) questioned
whether "...speci￿c fundamentals [can] be identi￿ed as state variables that
lead to common variation in returns that is independent of the market and
carries a di⁄erent premium than general market risk". This conjecture mo-
tivated signi￿cant research e⁄ort to relate the returns of Fama-French portfo-
lios with speci￿c economic and ￿nancial variables. Liew and Vassalou (2000)
argued that size and value returns have predictive ability for future GDP
growth for a series of markets. Extending these results, Vassalou (2003) cre-
ates a mimicking portfolio, which proxies news to future GDP growth and
argues that this can explain the cross-section behaviour of the Fama-French
portfolios.
On the other hand, Brennan et al. (2004) use as intertemporal risk factors
the real interest rate and the Sharpe Ratio. Petkova (2006) devises an as-
14set pricing model using the ￿nancial variables that have been employed to
predict future stock returns (dividend yield, term spread, default spread and
the short term rate). Showing the superior explanatory ability of the shocks
to these variables in comparison to the Fama-French portfolios, she estab-
lishes a link between the cross-section and the time-series behaviour of the
stock returns. Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) suggest a two-beta model,
explicitly specifying the cash ￿ ows and the discount rate as risk factors in an
intertemporal asset pricing model.
Summarizing, there have been several promising attempts to rationalize
the Fama-French anomalies within an intertemporal framework. All these
studies essentially assume the existence of a set of risk factors, which vary
stochastically and their innovations are correlated with the innovations to the
stock returns. Such a setup generates intertemporal risk premia, as shown
in Merton (1973). It is argued here that these intertemporal risk premia can
be statically represented in terms of skewness and kurtosis. To show that
formally, let us ￿x a probability space (￿;F;P) and the information ￿ltration
(Ft) = fFt : t ￿ 0g: Let St be the stock price and Xt the underlying risk
factor at time t. The processes (St; Xt) form jointly a Markov process in




= ￿dt + ￿s
p
XdWSt (23)
dXt = k(￿ ￿ X)dt + ￿x
p
XdWXt (24)
where dW = (dWS;dWX)0 is a vector of standard Brownian motions
adapted to (Ft) and the two Brownian motions have correlation coe¢ cient
(dWS)(dWX) = ￿sxdt. An important observation is that even though the
processes (St;Xt) are jointly Markovian, the process of the risky asset price
(St) is not necessarily Markovian. In other words, the entire history of ob-
servations could provide important information for the future stock price
15movements.
In order to ￿nd the moments of the the stock returns given the presence
of the underlying stochastic factor X, it is most convenient to derive the joint
conditional characteristic function of the processes (St; Xt) and to work out
the unconditional characteristic function of the risky asset returns ￿st+1 =
st+1 ￿ st, where st = lnSt.
The joint conditional characteristic function is given by:
’(u1;u2;St+￿;Xt+￿jSt;Xt) = E[exp(iu1St+￿ + iu2Xt+￿)jSt;Xt] (25)




























Due to a¢ ne structure of the processes (see Du¢ e et al., 2000), we con-
jecture the trial form for the characteristic function to be:
’(u1;u2;St+￿;Xt+￿jSt;Xt) = expfC(￿;u1;u2)+D1(￿;u1;u2)St+D2(￿;u1;u2)Xtg
(27)
with the terminal conditions: C(0;u1;u2) = 0, D1(0;u1;u2) = iu1, D2(0;u1;u2) =
iu2.
Replacing this trial form into the Kolmogorov equation and simpli￿ying
we get:























A separation of variables argument yields the following ODEs:
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= 0 ) D1 = iu1 (29)
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x + D2(iu1￿s￿x￿sx ￿ k) (31)
with the terminal conditions previously de￿ned. This is a system of
ODEs. In particular, we get:
D1 = iu1 (32)
The ODE with respect to D2(￿) is of Riccati type and can be solved
analytically. In particular, de￿ning a = iu1￿S￿X￿SX ￿ k, b = 1
2￿2




S,   =
p
a2 ￿ 4bc, the solution is given by:
D2(￿) = ￿
2(exp( ￿) ￿ 1)
(a +  )(exp( ￿) ￿ 1) + 2 
c + iu2￿ (33)
Consequently, C(￿) is given by:
C(￿) = iu1￿￿ + iu2k￿￿￿
￿2ck￿[
2ln[a(exp( ￿) ￿ 1) +  (exp( ￿) + 1)] ￿ 2ln(2 ) ￿ (a +  )￿]
(  + a)(  ￿ a)
]
Using Lemmas 2 and 3 of Jiang and Knight (2002), given the joint condi-
tional characteristic function, we can derive the unconditional characteristic
function of ￿st+1 by:
’(u1;u2;￿st+1) = expfC(1;u1;0)g (D2(1;u1;0);X0) (34)
17where  (D2(1;u1;0);X0) is the characteristic function of X0. This follows
a Gamma distribution with mean ￿ and variance
￿￿2
x
2k . Given the solutions to
the ODEs and since Xt follows a Gamma distribution,
’(u1;u2;￿st+1) =
= expfiu1￿ ￿ 2ck￿[
2ln[a(exp( ) ￿ 1) +  (exp( ) + 1)] ￿ 2ln(2 ) ￿ (a +  )










= expfiu1￿ ￿ 2ck￿[
2ln[a(exp( ) ￿ 1) +  (exp( ) + 1)] ￿ 2ln(2 ) ￿ (a +  )
(  + a)(  ￿ a)
]g
(1 +
2(exp( ) ￿ 1)









Given this characteristic function, we can ￿nd the moments of the returns
process:























We see that the skewness of the returns￿distribution crucially depends on
the sign of the correlation of the shocks. Trivially, if there is zero correlation,
then the returns distribution is symmetric. If the correlation is negative, then
the returns￿distribution is negatively skewed. Interestingly, there is a series
of studies in the dynamic asset allocation literature, which report a negative
18correlation between the shocks to the risky assets and the shocks to the un-
derlying risk factor. We refer inter alia to Brennan et al. (1997), who use the
dividend yield, the short and the long rate as the stochastic factors, Camp-
bell and Viceira (1999) and Barberis (2000), who use the dividend yield and
Wachter (2002), who uses the Sharpe ratio. This negative correlation, which
would be equivalent to negative skewness in the asset returns according to
the previous setup, gives rise to a hedging demand component in the optimal
portfolio choice of the long-term, risk-averse investor. Consequently, risky
assets incorporate a hedging value with respect to intertemporal risks, which
are shown to be equivalent to negative skewness risk within this framework.
Since intertemporal risks can be statically re￿ ected by means of higher
moments, it is argued that the Fama-French factors essentially proxy neg-
ative skewness or excess kurtosis. Con￿ning ourselves to negative skewness,
the study of Harvey and Siddique (2000) establishes such a link. They show
that the excess returns generated by the value, size and momentum portfolios
can be partly explained by the fact that these portfolios are negatively co-
skewed with the market returns. Consequently, the implementation of these
strategies is essentially adding negative skewness to the portfolios, so the
excess returns generated by these strategies are due to the assumption of
skewness risk. As they comment (p. 1283): "HML and SMB [portfolios],
to some extent, capture information similar to that captured by skewness".
A direct consequence of the previous analysis is that the two approaches to
asset pricing -intertemporal risk premia and higher moments risk premia- are
essentially equivalent. It is important to note that it is not necessary for the
value and small stock returns to be negatively skewed, but rather that they
are less positively skewed in comparison to the growth and big size stock
returns correspondingly.
Examining further this link, stocks with high book to value ratios and
small size are dominated by cash-￿ ows (earnings) risk, as argued in Campbell
and Vuolteenaho (2004). An earnings shock has an irreversible e⁄ect through
19time, while an interest rate shock has a partly reversible e⁄ect, because
interest rates determine the rates of returns apart from discounting future
cash ￿ ows. If investors are forward looking and price these intertemporal
risks, a shock to the cash ￿ ow will have a higher impact on prices today,
while an interest rate shock is expected to have a lower impact due to its
reversibility through time.
This is su¢ cient to argue that assets with high earnings risk are expected
to incorporate a higher risk premium. In terms of moments, this argument
essentially implies that small size and value stocks are expected to have
higher cokurtosis, because a shock to earnings will have a larger impact on
their prices, in comparison to big size and growth stocks, which are mainly
characterized by interest rate risk. However, bearing in mind that negative
shocks (news) typically have a stronger impact than positive shocks (news),
see Conrad et al. (2002), as well as the asymmetric impact of gains and losses
on preferences, this feature leads to negative coskewness.
Providing further reasoning for the small size stock anomaly, it is claimed
that small size stocks are expected to have higher negative skewness in com-
parison to the big size stocks because they have lower survival probability
rates. Small size stocks are thought to be more vulnerable to negative shocks
because they are mainly new companies with lower capital capacity and they
have higher probabilities of ceasing operations.
Regarding the ouperformance of the momentum strategy, there has not
been any successful intertemporal framework to provide an explanation of
its outperformance. As Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) remark (p. 1270):
"We are pessimistic about the two-beta model￿ s ability to explain average re-
turns on portfolios formed on past one-year stock returns". The explanation
we put forward is related to the limited liability property of the assets. If
there is a hypothetical range of values for the asset, past losers are thought
to have shifted closer to the left end of this interval, so the downside risk
over the next periods is thought now to be much lower in comparison to past
20winners who have shifted to the right end. Since asset values essentially have
a left truncated distribution, the closer the asset price is to this left end, the
more positively coskewed with the market returns it will be.
3 Performance measures and incentives in fund
management
3.1 Raw returns
Since the work of Markowitz (1952), it has been understood that there exists
a direct positive relationship between risk and return. However, managers
and funds are still often ranked according to their raw returns. The new
breed of funds appearing as "absolute-return" seeking funds re￿ ects the lack
of understanding of the notions of risk and return. Using raw returns as
a performance measure essentially means that the investor is indi⁄erent to
risk, i.e. his utility is not decreasing in volatility/risk. Hence risk premia
are thought to be a "free lunch". Evaluating a manager￿ s performance using
such a measure, he will be incentivised to undertake the highest possible risk.
3.2 Sharpe ratio
On the other hand, most of the academic literature has been evaluating
investment strategies according to their risk-adjusted returns. One of the
most commonly used measures of risk-adjusted performance is the Sharpe





where Rp is the fund￿ s return, rf is the risk-free rate and ￿p is the standard
deviation of the returns. Using this measure, fund managers do not have the
21incentive to invest in more volatile assets, since higher volatility essentially
penalizes their excess returns.
The Sharpe ratio is, however, a purely mean-variance measure, neglecting
higher moments. Nevertheless, these higher moments bear risk premia in a
market with prudent, long-term investors, as it was previously discussed.
Consequently, the rational response of the fund managers is to invest in
assets that exhibit negative skewness and excess kurtosis in order to reap the
corresponding risk premia. For example, a manager could shift from an asset
class to another one with the same volatility, but higher negative skewness
and, as a result, higher expected returns. This will create a higher Sharpe
ratio and the manager will be classi￿ed as a Winner.2
There is a series of examples documenting the existence of these strategies.
Investing in emerging countries￿and junk bonds is a straightforward case.
These bonds have higher probability of default in comparison to investment
grade bonds. As a result, their returns are more negatively skewed and they
provide higher yields. If a manager matches bonds with the same volatility
but with di⁄erent degrees of skewness, he can substitute the ones with low
skewness for the ones with higher negative skewness in order to have a higher
Sharpe ratio- until the default occurs.
Goetzmann et al. (2007) analyze methods of maximizing a portfolio￿ s
Sharpe ratio using derivatives. Shorting di⁄erent fractions of out-of-the-
money puts and calls creates a negatively skewed distribution of returns and
leads to the maximal Sharpe ratio. Their example also shows that hedge
funds and other investment vehicles which use derivative assets can manip-
ulate their Sharpe ratio. Leland (1999) provides an example of a dynamic
strategy of cash and stocks as well as static strategies using options, which
2Fund management practice shows that managers try to ￿nd and exploit patterns in
stock returns in order to generate portfolios that beat the measures according to which
they are evaluated. Therefore, a negative coskewness strategy does not necessarily mean
that the manager consciously picks stocks with this characteristic, but that the strategies
he implements actually mimick this statistical characteristic.
22generate negative skewness and outperform in terms of Sharpe ratio. There-
fore, such funds should not be evaluated by mean-variance measures.
The inappropriateness of the Sharpe ratio for skewed returns is also men-
tioned in Ziemba (2005), who provides a modi￿cation of the Sharpe ratio to
emphasize the importance of the downside risk. The Symmetric Downside-
















where the returns (rt) used are those below E(r). This measure essentially
replaces the upside deviation by the downside risk, using the semi-variance
instead of using the variance to adjust the excess returns.
3.3 Jensen Alpha and Treynor Ratio
Within the CAPM framework, Jensen (1968) introduced the intercept of the
regression as a measure for the fund manager￿ s ability:
rp;t = ￿Jensen + ￿prM;t + ￿t (43)
where rp;t is the excess returns of the trust, rM is the excess return of a
suitable market index and ￿p is the CAPM beta of the excess fund￿ s returns.
The intercept (￿Jensen) shows whether the manager has added any value
over and above the return justi￿ed by the risk he had undertaken. The
concept of risk here is summarized in the CAPM beta factor, which depends
on the covariance of the portfolio with the market returns, since this is the
only non-diversi￿able risk according to the CAPM theory.





Following the spirit of the Sharpe ratio, the Treynor ratio adjusts excess
returns for the corresponding CAPM beta risk (￿p).
As it has been analytically discussed, the CAPM provides a poor approx-
imation of reality. The CAPM is a mean-variance static measure, neglecting
all other sources of risk, in particular those arising due to the higher moments
and the stochastic evolution of the underlying risk factors a⁄ecting the asset
returns. Consequently, if evaluated by the CAPM, managers are incentiv-
ised to employ portfolio strategies, which load intertemporal and higher co-
moments risks in the portfolios. It is known that fund managers construct
portfolio strategies which exploit patterns such as the size, value and mo-
mentum anomalies to add value to their portfolios. Temporary success of
these strategies generates a positive Jensen alpha classifying the manager as
a Winner. These portfolio strategies have zero CAPM beta risk but they are
not necessarily riskless.
3.4 Carhart Alpha
The basic doctrine of ￿nancial theory is that "free lunches" in the spirit of
Harrison and Kreps (1979) should be ruled out.3 Furthermore, since the
Fama-French and momentum strategies are very simple to construct and
implement, these returns cannot be regarded as genuinely added value. Re-
￿ ecting these arguments, Carhart (1997) suggested a measure, the Carhart
alpha, which is the intercept of the four-factor model:
rp;t = ￿Carhart + ￿prM;t + ￿1SMB + ￿2HML + ￿3MOM + ￿t (45)
3Accepting "free lunches" would be equivalent to discarding asset allocation. If there
exist strategies which add value to portfolios without undertaking any further risk, then
the optimal portfolio choice collapses to an in￿nite demand schedule for these strategies.
24The Carhart regression (45) essentially attributes the fund returns gen-
erated by the size (SMB), value (HML) and momentum (MOM) strategies
to the corresponding risk factors. The intercept of this regression (￿Carhart)
shows the value the manager has added to his portfolio above what the beta
risk could justify and these known strategies could generate. The importance
of this measure is that it neutralizes the incentives to adopt these strategies,
since these are recognized as risk factors.
Despite the signi￿cance of this measure, managers would still try to ￿nd
patterns in stock returns in order to outperform even this measure. Even
though the Carhart model reduces the possible opportunities, there exist
other such strategies which load other types of risks, in order to outperform.
The need for a more general measure capturing all these kinds of risks is
obvious.
4 Data and Methodology
As it has been already discussed in the previous section, tactical asset alloc-
ation schemes will always ￿nd patterns to generate returns which will not be
captured by the previously presented measures. Therefore, it is argued that
instead of using mimicking portfolios for speci￿c strategies, an appropriate
measure should employ a portfolio mimicking the underlying risk factor.
We follow the methodology of Harvey and Siddique (2000) to construct
this portfolio. Using 60 months of returns, we regress the market model for
each individual stock
rit = a + brM;t + "t (46)
extracting the residuals "t, which by de￿nition are orthogonal to the mar-
ket returns rM. Therefore, these residuals are net of the systematic risk as
this is measured by the covariance of the stock returns with the market port-
folio. However, these residuals incorporate the coskewness risk. Therefore,
25we can get a measure of the standardized coskewness of each stock with the









and represents the contribution of a security to the skewness of a broader
portfolio.
Ranking the stocks according to this coskewness measure, we can form
a value-weighted portfolio of the 30% most positively coskewed stocks (S+),
while the 30% most negatively coskewed stocks form another portfolio (S￿).
The next step is to ￿nd their returns on the 61st month. The spread of
these two portfolios returns (S￿￿S+) will yield the return generated by the
self-￿nancing strategy of buying stocks with high negative coskewness and
selling stocks with positive coskewness.
Consequently, an investment strategy should be evaluated using the fol-
lowing model:
rt = aHS + brM;t + c(S
￿ ￿ S
+)t + "t (48)
The intercept of this model, (aHS), termed as the Harvey-Siddique alpha,
will give us the value added by the manager over and above the covariance and
negative coskewness risks. As Harvey and Siddique (2000, p. 1276), this asset
pricing model has two main advantages over a model which would include the
squared market returns as a factor (see Kraus-Litzenberger, 1976): Firstly,
the direct coskewness is constructed by residuals, so it is by construction
independent of the market return and, secondly, b is similar to the standard
CAPM beta. Moreover, standardized coskewness is unit free and analogous
to a factor loading. Apart from the parsimony in comparison to the Carhart
(1997) measure, the suggested measure is also more general since it will
capture the excess returns from any possible strategy that loads negative
skewness to the portfolio.
26To construct the coskewness measure ￿SKD we employ data for monthly
returns and market values of all stocks, being listed in the FTSE All Share
Index during the period 1986-2005 which had at least 61 observations. The
number of stocks utilized to create the coskewness portfolios varied from 413
(with market value of £339,404 mil.) in December 1991 to 581 in January
2004, (with market value of £1,045,331 mil.). The risk-free rate was the in-
terbank monthly rate and the market returns were the returns of the FTSE
All Share Index. The source for the data and the FTSE All Share Index
listings was Thomson Datastream and Worldscope. The coskewness portfo-
lios returns were constructed for the period January 1991 to December 2005
using the methodology described above. Table 1 presents the average returns
of the zero-cost coskewness spread portfolio (S￿￿S+) and the market excess
returns for various periods. A striking feature of the zero-cost portfolio is
that it yielded, on average, a return of 2:09% p:a:, over the period 1971-2005,
having a very low standard deviation. Figure 1 shows these returns along
with the excess market returns. The subperiod analysis showed that negative
coskewness was more signi￿cantly priced in the last subperiod, 2001-2005.
With respect to the Fama-French strategies, we approximate the Size
strategy as the di⁄erence between the monthly returns of the Hoare Govett
Small Cap and the FTSE 100 index and the Value strategy as the spread
between the monthly returns of the MSCI UK Growth and the MSCI UK
Value indices. As Table 1 shows these strategies yielded signi￿cant positive
returns only during the subperiod 2001-2005. To provide evidence for the
argument that the size and value strategies may mimick negative coskewness,
we explore the properties of their returns during this subperiod. Figure
2 and Firgure 3 plot the densities of the monthly returns of the size and
value strategies, correspondingly, during this period.4 As it is evident, the
4These and the distributions in the following ￿gures were smoothed using a kernel
density estimator. We employed a Gaussian kernel function and the corresponding optimal
bandwith (see Silverman, 1986, for an analytical treatment).
27returns of these strategies exhibited negative skewness. Furthermore, the
coe¢ cients of standardized coskewness for the period Jan 2001- Dec 2005
were ￿
SMB
SKD = ￿0:257 for the Size (SMB) strategy and ￿
HML
SKD = ￿0:107
for the Value (HML) strategy, demonstrating that these two strategies had
negatively coskewed returns indeed. Hence, a trust manager who followed
these strategies was loading negative skewness to his portfolio, extracting the
corresponding premium.
For the UK unit trusts5, the Lipper Fund Database was used to acquire
Net Asset Values (NAV) on a monthly basis. We selected the unit trusts
which are marked for sale in the UK and they have domicile either in UK
or overseas. The performance study refers to unit trusts which had as a
fund manager benchmark in the Lipper Database the FTSE All Share Index,
hence the returns of this index were used as a proxy for market returns. To
alleviate the problem of survivorship bias, the database we employ includes
unit trusts which have ceased operations before 2005. To have a meaningful
performance study, only trusts with more than 61 observations of NAVs were
employed.
This selection left us with 273 unit trusts having more than 60 monthly
returns for the period January 1991- December 2005. The minimum number
of trusts of our database was 150 trusts in 1991 and the maximum number
was 273 trusts in 2004. Table 2 shows the number of trusts for each subperiod
as well as their average returns.
5 Unit trust performance
5.1 Jensen alpha
The benchmark measure is the Jensen￿ s alpha given by the intercept of equa-
tion (43). Over the period 1991-2005, the average Jensen￿ s alpha of the ex-
5The term "unit trust" corresponds to the most common in US term "open-ended
mutual fund". Henceforth, the two terms will be interchangeably used.
28amined trusts was ￿1:23% p:a: This result implies that the average fund
manager had negative managerial ability, achieving lower returns than what
the exposure to the market risk would justify. Figure 4 shows the distri-
bution of the trusts￿alphas over during this period. It is evident that the
majority of the trusts have negative alphas, but the distribution exhibits
positive skewness and fat tails. This implies that there are a few trusts who
have quite high positive alphas. Having ranked the trusts according to their
alphas, Table 3 shows the corresponding values for various percentiles of the
distribution. The upper 25% of the trusts had a positive alpha, though very
few of these estimates were statistically signi￿cant. On the other side of the
distribution, the bottom 45% of the trusts exhibited alphas of less than ￿2%.
The common practice of ranking trusts according to the alpha point es-
timates can be misleading, since the standard error of the estimate is not
taken into account. It has been suggested (see Kosowski et al., 2006) that
ranking trusts according to their t-statistics is more appropriate, since this
adjusts the point estimate for its in-sample variability (standard error). Table
5 presents such a ranking, according to the t-OLS values. Using a 95% con￿d-
ence interval, only 5% of the trusts exhibit signi￿cantly positive managerial
ability. On the other hand, more than 30% exhibited signi￿cantly negative
managerial ability.
An immediate conclusion from the shape of the distribution is that, ac-
cording to this static, mean-variance measure, signi￿cant managerial ability
existed, but only for a very small portion of the trust managers. Further-
more, the mean-variance investors who chose the bottom 30% trusts would
have been signi￿cantly better o⁄if they had invested in low-cost index funds.
Since we deal with net returns, high expenses and management fees could
well be a reason for the signi￿cant underperformance of many trusts. The
nonnormality of the alphas￿distribution6 can be explained by two main hy-
6The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test was employed to formally test the hypothesis of nor-
mality for the standardized alphas. The hypothesis of normality was rejected at levels
29potheses: Firstly, that trust managers exhibit heterogeneous abilities with a
few managers being highly skillful and secondly that they adopted hetero-
geneous risk-taking strategies. The next subsections investigate further these
hypotheses.
5.2 Harvey-Siddique alpha
This subsection presents the results of the unit trusts￿evaluation using the
Harvey-Siddique asset pricing model of equation (48). Interestingly, the av-
erage Harvey-Siddique (H-S) alpha was ￿2:12 p:a: This is much lower than
the average Jensen￿ s alpha. Figure 4 plots the distribution of the alphas
according to these two asset pricing models. It is evident that the whole
distribution of the Harvey-Siddique alphas is shifted to the left. The main
explanation for this di⁄erence is that trust managers followed coskewness
strategies indeed, earning positive returns, which were regarded as "abnor-
mal returns" according to Jensen￿ s alpha. If a manager had genuinely added
value to his portfolio without adding negative coskewness, then there should
be no signi￿cant di⁄erence between these two measures. To verify this con-
jecture, it is interesting to note that 263 out of the total 273 trusts during
the examined period had a positive loading (coe¢ cient) on the coskewness
portfolio and this positive loading was statistically signi￿cant at a 95% level
for 175 funds. Figure 5 plots the density of these coe¢ cient estimates, show-
ing that the 95% of the trusts had a positive coe¢ cient estimate and more
than the 50% of the trusts had an estimate of more than 0.25. This ￿nding
con￿rms that the majority of the funds were employing strategies which es-
sentially loaded negative coskewness to the funds, though it does not mean
that they consciously followed the speci￿c coskewness spread strategy we
analyzed in Section 4.
Ranking the trusts according to their Harvey-Siddique alphas, Table 3 re-
ports their estimates for various percentiles of this distribution. It is striking
even lower than 1%.
30to observe that only the 16% of the trusts had positive alphas. On the other
hand, the 55% of the funds had an alpha of less than ￿2%. In particular,
the median trust had a negative alpha of ￿2:36% p:a: Ranking trusts accord-
ing to the t-value of these alphas, the results are equivalent. Only 3 funds
had signi￿cantly positive alphas at a 95% level, while 41% had signi￿cantly
negative alpha estimates at the 95% level. With respect to the distribution
of the alphas, this is now closer to normality,7 since it exhibits less positive
skewness in comparison to the Jensen￿ s alphas distribution. Interestingly, the
two trusts with the highest Jensen￿ s alphas (15:5% and 13:71% p:a: corres-
pondingly), which account for the extreme positive tail of the distribution,
are the trusts with the 2nd and 8th (out of 273) highest loadings of the
coskewness strategy (with factor estimates 1:53 and 0:98 correspondingly).
Hence, the heterogeneity risk-taking conjecture of the previous subsection
can be supported and part of this heterogeneity is due to the coskewness
risk.
There are two main conclusions from these results: The ￿rst is that
prudent and long-term investors, who are averse to skewness and should
use the Harvey-Siddique alpha to evaluate their trust managers, would have
been better o⁄ by investing in a low-cost index fund as compared to more
than 80% of the available trusts over the period 1991-2005. The second
conclusion is that managers were very successful in reaping the negative co-
skewness premium, presenting it as "added value"- higher Jensen￿ s alpha,
due to the static, mean-variance nature of the measure employed to evalu-
ate them. Figure 6 presents in a scatterplot the estimate of Jensen alpha
for each trust against the coe¢ cient estimate on the coskewness portfolio,
demonstrating this positive relationship.8 In other words, unit trusts would
have been useful investment vehicles for agents with quadratic preferences,
who regard the coskewness premium as "free lunch".
7The null hypothesis of normality is marginally rejected at a 5% level using the
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.
8The Pearson correlation coe¢ cient of these two series is 0.45.
315.3 Subperiod analysis
Due to the high turnover of trust managers as well as the di⁄erent market
phases they face, it is interesting to examine whether the previous ￿ndings
are robust for shorter time periods. Therefore, the total period is split into
3 subperiods of 5 years each. Table 2 gives the average returns the trusts
achieved as well as their average Jensen and Harvey-Siddique alpha. With
respect to average returns, there has been a signi￿cant improvement in com-
parison to the initial period of 1991-1995, when trusts underperformed the
market by more than 400 bps.
There are three possible explanations for this improvement: The ￿rst is
that there may have been a decrease in the expenses of the industry due
to higher competition caused by the entry of new trusts, passing more of
their managerial ability to the individual shareholder.9 The second is that
the trusts were more exposed to market risk from 1995 onwards. This hypo-
thesis cannot be supported by the data, since the average beta of the trusts
remained relatively stable and close to 0:93 for all three subperiods. The
third explanation is that managers added part of the coskewness premium
to their portfolios during the two last subperiods.
As Table 1 presents, the coskewness spread strategy, yielded signi￿cant
positive returns only after 1996. These returns were as high as 3:39% p:a:
during 2001-2005. Interestingly, the number of funds having positive loadings
to the coskewness risk increased as this premium was increasing. While
during the period 1991-1995 there were 113 trusts out of total 150 having a
positive loading (and only 26 of them being statistically signi￿cant at a 5%
level), during 1996-2000 there 167 out of 197 trusts with positive loadings
(now 46 of them being signi￿cant) while during 2001-2005, as many as 252
out of total 263 trusts were loading negative coskewness (with 160 of these
coe¢ cients being statistically signi￿cant). This is actually the period that
9This hypothesis is not testable, since no data on UK unit trusts￿expenses were avail-
able.
32the Value and the Size strategies yielded high positive returns. Concluding,
trust managers responded very quickly to the existence of this premium,
employing strategies that mimicked negative coskewness and correctly acted
according to their incentives, since the most of them were evaluated either
through their raw returns or through mean-variance measures.
The previous analysis explains the signi￿cant improvement in trusts￿
Jensen alphas over the subperiods presented in Table 4, where the median
trust started from an alpha of ￿4:1% p:a: during 1991-1995, this being signi-
￿cantly improved to ￿2:01% p:a: and ￿1:4% p:a: the next subperiods. Hence,
this provides further evidence that the trusts were successful in reaping the
negative coskewness premium, actually increasing their exposure to this risk
during the period its premium was at its highest levels. While this strategy
would have yielded a signi￿cant gain for a quadratic investor, it does not for
a prudent one, because at the same time it loads the negative skewness risk
that he is averse to.
To examine the evolution of managerial ability for a prudent, long-term
investor, Table 4 presents the Harvey-Siddique alphas and their t-statistics
for the three subperiods across various percentiles of the distribution. With
respect to the point estimates, in all three periods less than 30% of the trusts
had positive alphas. The median trust severely underperformed during the
period 1991-1995 having a H-S alpha of ￿4:25% p:a. This performance was
signi￿cantly improved in 1996-2000, but the median trust still had an alpha
of ￿2:43% p:a:. Nevertheless, this improvement was not continued in 2001-
2005, since the median fund achieved a H-S alpha of ￿2:68% p:a: Figure
7 plots the distributions of the trusts￿alphas for each of the subperiods.
While the distribution of alphas in 1996-2000 was shifted to the right in
comparison to the previous subperiod, it was then shifted to the left during
the period 2001-2005, exhibiting a large concentration of values around the
mean. Ranking trusts according to the t-values of their H-S alphas, it is
surprising to see than in the second and the third subperiod, apart from
33the top two trusts, there was no other with signi￿cant positive alpha. On
the other hand, in all three subperiods, more than 30% of the trusts had
signi￿cantly negative H-S alphas.
5.4 Bootstrap analysis
The previous subsections relied on standard t-statistics to examine the sig-
ni￿cance of the performance estimates, which is a valid procedure under
the assumption of normality for the regressions￿residuals. Nevertheless, the
nonnormality of the alphas￿distribution and the evidence of heterogeneous
risk-taking casts doubts on the validity of the normality assumption, espe-
cially for the trusts with extreme alphas. In other words, if the residuals are
not normally distributed, then the t-statistics may lead to spurious results
and the extreme alpha estimates may be due to sampling variability, i.e. luck.
In order to control for the sampling variability, this susbsection employs a
simple bootstrap methodology (see Hall, 1992, for an introduction).
In particular, we employ a procedure similar to the one suggested by
Kosowski et al. (2006), adjusted for the Harvey-Siddique asset pricing model.10
Using the saved residuals f^ ￿i;t;t = Ti0;:::;Ti1g for each trust i from the OLS
regression
rt = ^ aHS +^ brM;t + ^ c(S
￿ ￿ S
+)t +^ ￿t (49)
we draw a sample with replacement for each of the trusts and create a




Ti1g, where b is
an index for the bootstrap number and where each of the time series indices
sb
Ti0;:::;sb
Ti1 are drawn randomly from [Ti0;:::;Ti1]. Using this pseudo-time
series of resampled residuals, we construct for each trust i a time-series of
pseudo-mothly excess returns for each fund, under the null hypothesis that
^ aHS;i = 0:
10Cuthbertson et al. (2006) employ a bootstrap methodology to evaluate UK unit trusts
for a series of commonly used performance measures.
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for t = Ti0;:::;Ti1 and t" = sb
Ti0;:::;sb
Ti1. These pseudo-returns are sub-
sequently regressed again for each bootstrap sample b, as in equation (48),
extracting an alpha estimate f^ ab
HSg. Repeating the previous methodology
1,000 times, we have a distribution of 1,000 alpha estimates for each fund i.
Performing the same methodology for all funds i = 1;:::N, we can derive a
cross-section of bootstrapped alphas as well as their bootstrapped t-statistics.
These alphas and t-statistics result purely due to sampling variation, having
imposed the null hypothesis of a zero intercept (no managerial ability).
This methodology may be used for a series of robustness checks (see
Kosowski et al., 2006 for numerous examples). The focus of this subsection
is to examine the bootstrapped alphas for each of the funds in Table 3, i.e. for
di⁄erent percentiles of the Harvey-Siddique alpha distribution for the entire
period. If the actual alpha estimate of a trust is higher (lower) than the 95%
of the bootstrapped alpha estimates under the null hypothesis of zero alpha,
this means that the trust exhibited genuine positive (negative) managerial
skill beyond luck due to sampling variability.
The last line in Table 3 shows the bootstrapped p-values for the trusts
examined in the previous subsections. Almost for all funds below the median,
the negative managerial ability is genuine and not due to (bad) luck. On the
other hand, we identify that for a few top trusts the positive managerial
ability is again genuine, at least at a 10% con￿dence level. In general, the
qualitative conclusions were not di⁄erent from the previous inference analysis.
Controlling for the impact of sampling variation is more crucial when the
residuals￿distribution is quite asymmetric. However, as it can be seen from
Figure 8, the derived bootstrapped alphas￿distributions for a series of funds
are relatively symmetric, hence there is no signi￿cant di⁄erence with respect
to the parametric case. This is a quite interesting result, contrasting the
skewed bootstrapped alphas￿distributions derived in Kosowski et al. (2006).
35The explanation we put forward is that the inclusion of a coskewness factor
considerably contributes to the symmetry of the residuals￿distribution, since
it attributes highly skewed returns to the corresponding risk factor, unlike
mean-variance measures which would regard them as residuals.
6 Conclusion
Higher moments in asset returns is a relatively neglected issue in ￿nancial the-
ory and investment performance evaluation. This study shows how aversion
to negative skewness is built in commonly used utility functions and how
these preferences generate premia in capital markets. This issue becomes
even more important if one takes into account the experimental evidence
that negative returns a⁄ect utility asymmetrically more in comparison to
positive returns. Hence, a prudent investor should not use mean-variance
measures to evaluate his investments, because they neglect his actual pref-
erences and regard the negative coskewness premium as a "free lunch". In
the case of delegated asset management this issue is even more crucial, since
the fund manager judged by mean-variance measures will falsely interpret
that the fund shareholder has no preferences over skewness and he will be
incentivised to follow mechanical strategies that load this type of risk in or-
der to reap the corresponding premium. Clearly, this creates a mismatching
of objectives and outcome, leading to erroneous conclusions with respect to
the ex post veri￿cation of the fund management performance.
Moreover, the same problem arises due to the static nature of the com-
monly used measures. There is su¢ cient evidence that intertemporal risks
are priced too in capital markets, hence a long-term investor should take them
into account when evaluating his investment performance. The present study
utilizes a standard dynamic setup, where there is an underlying stochastic
factor a⁄ecting the dynamics of the risky asset returns and shows how inter-
temporal risks can be translated as a negative skewness risk. In particular,
36the hedging value of the asset returns against intertemporal risks can be
regarded as a premium for holding stocks with negative skewness.
The limitations of the static, mean-variance measures motivate the adop-
tion of a performance that adjusts for the negative coskewness premium. The
Harvey-Siddique two-factor asset pricing model is quali￿ed to be appropri-
ate for a prudent, long-term investor. The intercept of this model, which we
term as the Harvey-Siddique alpha, will reveal the genuine outperformance
for such an investor, resolving the ex post veri￿cation problem.
This measure is employed for the evaluation of UK unit trusts for the
period 1991-2005. In order to perform this evaluation, the returns of the
coskewness spread portfolio in the UK stock universe are calculated. This
portfolio yielded a signi￿cant positive return, especially in the last subperiod
of our sample. With respect to trust managers, the most of them had a neg-
ative Harvey-Siddique alpha, signi￿cantly undeperforming their benchmark.
Actually, the median underperformance of the trusts (￿2:12%) for prudent
investors was even higher than the current average expense ratio they charge
(circa 1:6%).
Interestingly, the most of the trusts loaded negative coskewness to their
portfolios, capturing part of the corresponding premium, correctly respond-
ing to their incentives, since they were evaluated by mean-variance measures.
This ￿nding shows how a prudent investor would misinterpret this premium
for genuinely added value if he was using such a measure. Hence, the call for
the shift of interest from outperforming to matching investors￿preferences
and objectives becomes even more important re￿ ecting the advice of Charles
Ellis (2005, p. 115) not to play "the Loser￿ s Game of trying to "beat the
market"- a game that almost every investor will eventually lose".
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434445464748Figure 1: This Figure shows the Excess returns of the FTSE All Share Index (orange
line) and the returns of the zero-cost Coskewness spread strategy (black line) as de￿ned
in Section 4, during the period Jan 1991- Dec 2005.
49Figure 2: This Figure shows the smoothed density of the Size (SMB) strategy
returns, as de￿ned in Section 4, for the period Jan 2001- Dec 2005.
50Figure 3: This Figure shows the smoothed density of the Value (HML) strategy
returns, as de￿ned in Section 4, for the period Jan 2001- Dec 2005.
51Figure 4: This Figure shows the distribution of the trusts￿Jensen alphas (blue
line) and the distribution of the trusts￿Harvey-Siddique alphas (red line) during
the period Jan 1991- Dec 2005.
52Figure 5: This Figure plots the density of the coe¢ cient estimates (c) on the
coskewness strategy for each trust from equation (48) for the period Jan 1991- Dec
2005.
53Figure 6: This Figure presents the scatterplot of Jensen alpha estimates from
equation (43) versus the coe¢ cient estimates (c) on the coskewness strategy from
equation (48) for each trust for the period Jan 1991- Dec 2005. It also plots the
￿tted values from a standard OLS regression for the same period.
54Figure 7: This Figure shows the distribution of trusts￿Harvey-Siddique alphas for
the periods: Jan 1991- Dec 1995 (blue line), Jan 1996- Dec 2000 (red line) and Jan
2001- Dec 2005 (green line).
55Figure 8: This Figure shows the density of the bootstrapped Harvey-Siddique
alphas under the null hypothesis of no managerial ability (blue line) and the actual
estimate of the H-S alpha (red line) for various rankings of the trusts according to
this estimate for the period Jan 1991- Dec 2005.
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